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 6  Empowered by choice? 
 Mairi  Levitt 
 At the heart of the right to know and the right not to know debate is the 
right to choose, which is predicated on the right to information, and other 
relevant resources, to enable a choice to be made. In many areas of every-
day life choices have proliferated; in affl uent countries there are more TV 
channels and types of eggs, ways of serving coffee or listening to music 
than ever before. Many of these choices may be trivial, but patients and 
parents are also increasingly bombarded with information and advice on 
more serious matters concerning health and child rearing. Patients and 
parents can obtain information to help make a choice of where to go for 
hospital treatment or which school they would like their child to attend. 
Hospital and school league tables and websites provide information on 
outcomes (e.g. survival rates after different types of surgery or examin-
ation pass rates), staffi ng levels and other factors that might infl uence 
decisions (hospital car parking or school uniform policy). Even in soci-
eties with universal health and education provision, it is acknowledged 
by providers that the more ‘informed and articulate’ have more choices, 
including the choice to go elsewhere into the private sector. 
 This chapter fi rst discusses the choice agenda in health and the effects 
of choice on the chooser. Next, the possibility and desirability of chan-
ging the focus from individual autonomy and ever-increasing choice is 
considered and discussed through the example of the genetic screening 
of embryos and children. 
 The assumption is frequently made that the individual will be empow-
ered by choice , and more empowered when more choices are offered. In 
a study of an attempt to ‘empower’ the lives of elderly people living in 
long-stay hospital wards, empowerment was said to be about:
 people’s ability to control their lives and act as autonomous individuals. It is 
about people being able to defi ne their own needs, rather than their needs being 
defi ned for them 
 (Ahlquist  1997 , p. 4) 
 Empowerment was a means to improve the quality of individuals’ lives. 
In any society there is a relation between power and status on the one 
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hand and the choices available to people on the other. The impoverished 
are not only economically poor but will generally have fewer choices and 
control in all areas of their lives than the more affl uent. Although increas-
ing choice for all does not necessarily reduce these inequalities, the cen-
trality of choice in education and health in the UK stresses an equal 
opportunities agenda. 
 Choice has always been available to some people. Some have had the resources 
to opt out of the NHS. Others have proved informed and articulate enough to 
access choices within the NHS that are not routinely available to others. 
 The Government believes that all patients should have the advantages of 
choices over their healthcare. The NHS should develop as a personalised service, 
open to everyone 
 (Department of Health  2000 ) 
 The NHS Plan quoted above went on to stress the importance of a 
diversity of provision from which choices can be made to meet differ-
ent needs. ‘Equity and Excellence’ was the title of the government white 
paper (Department of Health  2010 ). Decision making, it stated, is to 
be shared with patients who are to have information, choice and con-
trol. This is said to result in increased effi ciency and higher standards in 
the health-care system. The subsequent consultation on the proposals 
had a ‘vision of informed, empowered patients making personal choices’ 
but acknowledged that there are ‘major challenges in making sure that 
everyone can exercise choices that do not cause problems for them or the 
NHS (Department of Health 2010, point 7). 
 Choice alone, even in the absence of economic costs, does not ensure 
equality. In health care, and others areas such as education, the active, 
information-seeking, articulate parent or patient is both a problem, 
because their success in getting the best service impacts on others, and 
the model to emulate. 
 While it could be argued that what people really want is access to a 
good local hospital, rather than more choices, the assumption is that 
increased choice leads to greater satisfaction. Where there is more choice, 
fewer people are likely to get their fi rst choice because the hospitals and 
facilities considered to be the best will tend to be oversubscribed. A 
report on the ethics of rationing in the NHS makes the case for ‘nudg-
ing’ patient choice:
 Patients should be ‘nudged’ towards preferred uses of NHS services, through the 
provision of clear information and making it easy for patients to make the ‘right’ 
choices 
 (Rumbold  et al .  2012 , p. 44) 
 Since the hospitals considered to be the best will be the most diffi cult to 
access, it seems likely that the existence, if not the reality, of choice will 
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widen inequalities because those with the most social capital will fi nd out 
the criteria to be given priority and endeavour to fulfi l them, whatever 
they are. 
 In the commercial sector companies endeavour to persuade consumers 
to choose their products and be satisfi ed enough with their choice to pur-
chase them again. Public providers hope that, in taking on responsibility 
for choice from the professionals, individuals will be both more satisfi ed 
and more engaged in the process. 
 There is extensive research into the effects of an ever-increasing range 
of choices on the chooser. While this is mainly in the fi eld of consumer 
behaviour it has been applied to other fi elds, including choices in higher 
education (Arterian  2007 ) and health (Botti  et al .  2009 ). Some key fi nd-
ings of these US studies are that:
 Being able to make choices has a benefi cial effect on motivation and • 
performance in research where participants are asked to complete 
tasks, including creative tasks and at work where people have some 
control over their physical environment. 
 There are class and cultural differences in the value accorded to being • 
able to choose. 
 Greatly increased choices in consumer goods can lead to confusion and • 
indecision resulting in people being reluctant to choose at all (Chua 
and Iyengar  2006 , p. 56). 
 Being offered choice between undesirable options causes stress, anx-• 
iety and confl ict in the chooser (Chua and Iyengar  2006 : p. 54). In 
these circumstances those for whom a choice is made are more satis-
fi ed than those who choose for themselves. 
 Those who explore every option before choosing (‘maximisers’) tend • 
to have high expectations which are unlikely to be fulfi lled and they 
suffer from dissatisfaction and stress (Schwartz  2004 ). 
 These studies begin to differentiate between choosers and subdivide 
them into groups according to personality traits, assessed by psycho-
logical tests, by culture and socio-economic status. The fi ndings con-
fi rm that having choices is valued by those who are well educated, in 
a middle class or professional occupation and from a Western cultural 
background that valorises individualism rather than interdependence 
(Chua and Iyengar  2006 ). As Matravers argues, in western societies to 
be an adult is to be an agent, with the ability to choose and liable to be 
held to account for the choices made (Matravers  2007 , p. 4). Stephens, 
Markus and Townsend argue that choice is associated with agency but 
that agency is more central to the middle classes than it is to the work-
ing class, for whom conformity to the group is important to well-being 
(Stephens  et al.  2007 , p. 827). 
9781107076075c06_p85-99.indd   87 5/10/2014   12:02:42 PM
Mairi Levitt88
  Choice and responsibility 
 In making a choice individuals become responsible for the outcome. It 
is their choice, whether good or bad. Of course not all choices can be 
lumped together and when it comes to choices that have a tragic conse-
quence (e.g. the death of a newborn baby) parents who made the choice 
for themselves were found to cope less well with the outcome. An ethno-
graphic study comparing parents with new-born children on life support 
in France and the USA found that decisions to switch off the machine 
were left to the physicians in France, whereas in USA parents had to 
make decisions themselves. The researchers concluded that ‘when con-
fronted by tragic choices individuals are likely to be better off if those 
choices are either physically or psychologically removed from them’ 
(Botti  et al .  2009 , p. 349). 
 The authors do not use their fi ndings to call for a return to paternalism 
but rather to argue that it is too simple to say offering choice is best when 
dealing with ‘messy realities’ and that the demand for participation will 
vary between parents (Botti  et al .  2009 , p. 350). Bearing the responsibil-
ity for choice was a burden for parents in those circumstances; they felt 
they were being asked to choose for their child to die, and to be able to 
follow expert advice provided support and made them feel better about 
the decision. 
 Similar fi ndings were made in a qualitative study of UK women making 
decisions in pregnancy about antenatal screening (Ahmed  et al .  2012 ). 
In the UK health professionals are required to provide the information 
necessary for patients to make ‘autonomous, informed decisions’ by 
providing the necessary value-neutral information and be non-directive 
(Ahmed  et al . 2012, p. 2). While some have long argued that the ideology 
of genetic counselling does not, or cannot, be realised in practice (Clarke 
 1991 ; Mitchie  et al .  1997 ) this study by Ahmed  et al . found that women 
wanted advice to help them come to a decision about screening. The 
women interpreted ‘advice’ in different ways: as information alone, as 
guidance and support and as providing direction. Most understood that 
professionals did not want to give an opinion for ethical reasons, and the 
fear of being sued, but they would have valued their advice in order to 
help them come to their own decision (Ahmed  et al . 2012, p. 6). 
 The problem with making choices in the real world is that outcomes 
are not predictable and so however much information is available it can-
not answer the crucial question: will  my baby be healthy? If I undergo 
one more course of IVF will  I have a successful pregnancy? However 
small the risk, your baby may be the one in a thousand that has the con-
dition; however many courses of IVF you have had there is a chance that 
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the next one will be successful so how can you make the decision to stop? 
While the ideal situation is one in which ‘the individual is free to select 
whatever action she or he desires…’(Paton  2007 ), in practice individ-
uals live in particular social and cultural contexts that impinge on their 
decision making. Where IVF treatment is publicly funded treatment will 
usually be limited; in England and Wales the recommendation is that 
three cycles should be offered for women who meet the criteria (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence  2004 ). Women who can pay for private 
treatment have more choices. In Peddie  et al .’s study of women who 
had undergone IVF without success, the psychological, emotional and 
social costs of prolonged and unsuccessful treatment were clear but the 
decision to end treatment was diffi cult. Two themes in the fi ndings were 
unrealistic expectations of success and social and media pressure; the 
social obligation to keep trying new technology and the constant prom-
ises of new breakthroughs that might offer new hope (Peddie  et al .  2005 , 
p. 1946). In this example women are being asked to choose between 
undesirable options: stopping treatment and so acknowledging that they 
will almost certainly never give birth or continuing expensive treatment 
which affects their health with a diminishing chance of success after 
unsuccessful cycles. 
 The choice discourse is convenient for service providers and diffi cult 
for individuals to resist. However, as discussed, ever-increasing choices 
in consumer goods and health care do not ensure consumer or patient 
satisfaction or happiness. Rather, a ‘proliferation of options seems to 
lead, inexorably, to the raising of expectations’ (Schwartz  2004 , p. 186). 
In a publicly funded health system, there will inevitably be dissatisfaction 
among those who fi nd that the choice they made is not in fact available. 
  Choosing as self-expression 
 The act of choosing is not just important because of the value attached to 
autonomy and the association of choice with freedom but because mak-
ing choices is an expression of who we are (Iyengar  2010 ). We defi ne who 
we are in relation to other people, so choosing is actually a social act that 
communicates to others what sort of persona we want to portray. As we 
choose we ask ‘What kind of individual am I, and given who I am, what 
should I want, and given what I should want, what do I choose?’ (Iyengar 
 2010 , p. 272). 
 In this self-conscious model of the individual, we constantly monitor 
the reactions of others and modify our behaviour and choices accord-
ingly. In the classic social constructivist account human beings construct 
their social world through interactions with others and then perceive 
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it as objective reality which in turn constrains their actions. The ability 
to shape our environment could mean that human beings were over-
whelmed by the constant choices that had to be made. As discussed ear-
lier, the multiplication of choices can lead to confusion and anxiety and 
the way of resolving this is to limit the need for decisions by establishing 
standards, routines and habits that reduce the need for choice (Schwartz 
 2004 , p. 114). 
 In every society there are socially acceptable ways of doing things that 
remove the need for individuals to decide how to act in every situation; 
their actions become habitualised: ‘Habitualization carries with it the 
important psychological gain that choices are narrowed … This frees the 
individual from the burden of all those decisions’ (Berger and Luckmann 
 1967 , p. 71). 
 In many modern societies choices have multiplied in areas where there 
were once strong norms and sanctions for those who broke them, for 
example, sexuality, family life and gender roles. 
  Removing choice 
 As ‘choices’ are burgeoning in both the public and private health sec-
tors, is there an alternative to the stress on choice; could choices be 
restricted on ethical grounds that would be socially acceptable? The 
idea of simply removing choice has been discussed in relation to par-
ticipation in medical research and to organ donation, both areas where 
informed consent must be obtained (Evans  2004 ; Harris  2003 ). The 
value attached to informed consent makes any suggestions of com-
pulsion controversial. Evans ( 2004 ) argues that, in a publicly funded 
health-care system, there is a moral duty to take part in research in 
some circumstances. He limits this to cases where the patient has sought 
treatment for a condition and is eligible to be enrolled in research into 
treatment , the research is not expected to harm the patient and it may 
benefi t others. In these circumstances enrolment should be automatic:
 And because not everyone can be relied on to do their duty, in clinical research 
… then responsibility for the decision must be given to others. You should be 
entered into the research automatically, and if you want to obtain treatment in 
these circumstances then you should no more have a veto over taking part in the 
research than you should have a veto over paying your income tax 
 (Evans  2004 , p. 202) 
 The argument is that those currently having treatment benefi t from those 
who took part in medical research in the past and thus have an obligation 
to help others in the future. 
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 In the case of organ donation many European countries have some 
form of opt-out system where the onus is on those who do not want 
to donate to make their wishes known. However, in practice, even in 
Spain, which has the highest rates of cadaveric donation, organs are 
not removed unless the family agrees (Navarro-Michel  2011 , p. 160). 
Compulsion even in limited circumstances is controversial. After all, the 
emphasis on informed consent and the frameworks for ethical review 
of research involving human subjects followed the abuses carried out in 
the name of medical research in the 1930s and 40s. Abuses in human 
medical research have often involved subjects who are neither high sta-
tus nor powerful. So, looking at the analogy Evans draws with income 
tax payment above, there are ways in which the elite may minimise their 
tax payments with the help of experts, while most UK employees have 
tax deducted by their employer. No doubt there would also be ways of 
avoiding compulsory enrolment in research for those with the resources 
to seek alternative treatment. 
 Imposing compulsion in an attempt to reach a desired end in health 
care – a wider cross section of medical research subjects, more organs 
for transplant – might not be workable in a democracy. Would the media 
soon be reporting on tearful relatives whose loved ones’ organs were taken 
against their wishes or on people refusing treatment because they did not 
want to be enrolled in medical research? But what about alternative eth-
ical framings that are less individualistic? There have been criticisms of 
the value accorded to individual autonomy and a counter move in eth-
ics to more communitarian values such as solidarity, reciprocity , dignity 
and prudence (Hayry  2003 ; Knoppers and Chadwick  2005 ). When dis-
cussing donations to biobanks , population genetic databases established 
for research purposes, the argument can be made for a solidarity-based 
approach rather than one based on individual autonomy (Prainsack and 
Buyx  2012 ). However, in other areas such as genetic testing , a solidarity 
approach seems less tenable because it would require people who are 
making choices about what is best for themselves or their children to 
focus on broader issues . 
  Genetic tests, treatment and enhancement 
 For the individual, genetic tests are available for an ever-increasing range 
of traits that carry elevated risk of developing a disease or behavioural 
condition. Most people are probably unaware of the profusion of genetic 
tests but those who are pregnant, undergoing IVF or have a family his-
tory of a specifi c disorder will be offered a limited range of tests. While 
access to genetic testing will be restricted for publicly funded patients, 
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and may vary according to their location, privately funded patients have 
more choices, which in turn puts pressure on the public health service 
to increase availability. Since 2009 UK clinics that offer fertility services 
have been licensed to test patients for specifi c genetic traits through pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), rather than having to apply on a 
case by case basis. Since 2010, traits that indicate lower penetrance and 
late onset conditions can be included, meaning that a percentage of those 
with the trait will never develop the condition and others will develop it 
only in adulthood. These include BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations that 
carry an increased risk of breast and ovarian cancer and early onset 
Altzheimer’s disease. For UK women with a breast cancer trait, their life-
time risk of developing breast cancer is raised from around 12 per cent to 
over half. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) 
undertook a consultation entitled ‘Choices and Boundaries’, before 
introducing PGD for these conditions (HFEA  2006 ). A response from 
Genewatch UK objected to the use of the term ‘choice’ rather than ‘deci-
sion’ in the title of the consultation, on the grounds that it ‘tends to turn 
the process into one of marketing, not serious deliberation’(Genewatch 
UK  2006 ). The particular imperative to emphasise choice in genetics is 
of course the shadow of eugenics in the sense of state-enforced controls 
over births. Wachbroit and Wasserman argue that this legacy of abuse is 
why those patients who are offered genetic tests and disease screening are 
seen to require specialist counsellors. The offi cial role of genetic coun-
sellors is non-directive; they are to offer individualistic, client-centred 
therapy that allows patients to make their own decisions (Wachbroit and 
Wasserman  1995 , p. 238). As has been pointed out, the cumulative effect 
of individual choices can, like state-enforced controls, also lead to soci-
etal change. For instance, preferences for boys over girls have resulted in 
distorted sex ratios in parts of India and China (Hesketh  2011 ). 
 Regulation within a country may limit access to PGD, prenatal testing 
and childhood testing but direct-to-consumer testing operating in less 
regulated environments opens up availability. Is individual choice in this 
area empowering and, if so, who is empowered? 
 Savulescu supports a broadening of PGD to non-disease traits. In his 
view, parents should have information about non-disease traits through 
genetic testing , be able to freely choose which child to bear through 
PGD and be provided with ‘non-coercive advice’ on which child has 
the highest chance of having the best life (Savulescu  2001 , p. 424–5). 
Using the Internet and international market consumers can currently 
purchase tests for themselves and their children either individually, as 
a package, or arrange an entire genome scan. They can investigate their 
genetic risk for all sorts of physical and mental disorders, including 
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complex multifactorial disorders, for their genetic ancestry , can identify 
those genetically related to them or check out their child’s ‘inborn tal-
ent’. Companies based in the USA that offer hundreds of tests and even 
whole genome scans include 23andMe, deCODEme and SeqWright, 
all easily found by a web search engine. The California Department of 
Public Health wrote to thirteen companies based in the state requesting 
that they ‘cease and desist’ from offering testing to California residents 
(Magnus  et al .  2009 ). The State of California requires companies offer-
ing such tests to be licensed and patients should not access tests without 
a physician’s order ( ibid .). The companies that replied made three argu-
ments: that genetic information is a fundamental part of a person and 
individuals have a right to it; that the tests are not really genetic because 
they give information on genetic predisposition; and that people should 
have access to their own health information directly, without having to 
involve a physician ( ibid .). 
 The company 23andMe markets DNA testing as ‘a “one size fi ts all” 
perfect gift’ that will allow the recipient to: ‘Gain insight into your traits, 
from baldness to muscle performance. Discover risk factors for more than 
200 health conditions with the assurance that the list grows each month’. 
These ‘health conditions’ include serious diseases like breast, stomach 
and lung cancer, Parkinson’s disease and Alzheimer’s disease, so it might 
not be a ‘perfect gift’ for all! For those testing newborn babies or toddlers 
who cannot yet spit, there is the opportunity to send for a special test kit 
that requires only a quarter teaspoon of saliva to be collected. No restric-
tions on parents testing their children are mentioned here. 
 Although the arguments evoke individual autonomy and the right to 
know, company websites may also appeal to solidarity and community 
in their marketing. The 23andMe website contains research fi ndings and 
in a section entitled ‘core values’ has the following message to potential 
patients:
 you’re joining in a community of motivated individuals who can collectively 
impact research and basic human understanding. In today’s connected informa-
tion age, it’s no longer just about me. Instead it is about how we can change our 
understanding of ourselves by joining together 
 Another group of companies target their products specifi cally at parents 
of young children. Companies such as talent4me and My Gene Profi le 
offer a raft of genetic tests claiming to reveal your child’s ‘inborn talents’. 
Parents are told that they will fi nd out whether their child has a particu-
lar sporting talent or is musical so that they know how to best direct their 
child and avoid the frustration and failure that comes of encouraging par-
ticipation in a type of sport in which he or she will not succeed. Parents 
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can replace the hit-and-miss approach of giving their child all sorts of 
enrichment classes and instead take scientifi c direction, know where the 
child’s talents lie and ‘spend money wisely’ (My Gene Profi le). 
 Leaving aside the question of the validity and reliability of the tests and 
how many parents have actually used them, it is clear that the website 
material plays on parental insecurities and competitiveness. Your child 
can only succeed by having the edge over other people’s children:
 These advertisements describe complex, confusing, and anxiety-producing 
genetic concepts for the consumer. Drawing on themes of ‘choice,’ ‘hope,’ ‘fear’, 
and ‘peace of mind,’ these advertisements validate patients’ worries about their 
genetic risks and appeal to their desire to assert control over potential outcomes 
 (Golhurst  et al .  2002 ) 
 The advertisements are designed to create desires and demands in par-
ents, increase the numbers using genetic testing and provide ‘solutions’ 
to problems that parents did not previously know they had (Genewatch 
UK  2006 ). The view of genes conveyed in the brochure (English version) 
is that they are static things that can be read off to see whether or not a 
child has a strong ‘leadership gene’ or ‘performance gene’ so that parents 
can have scientifi c direction rather than a hit-and-miss approach to help-
ing their children. 
 If parents took up the opportunity to access these tests to get the edge 
for their child, or prospective child, weighing up what to do with the 
results, whether using PGD or discerning a child’s ‘inborn talent’ may 
not be straightforward. The more tests that can be performed the harder 
it will be to decide which the ‘best’ potential child is, or, which inborn 
talent to pursue. The embryo with the predisposition to aggression and 
criminal behaviour seems an obvious one to discard but if the increased 
risk is only in cases where the child is maltreated (Caspi  et al .  2002 ) then 
perhaps this is better than a predisposition to alcoholism. If your child’s 
inborn talent test reveals a talent for rugby football and susceptibility to 
alcohol addiction then perhaps the responsible parent would not encour-
age the child to play rugby because of the temptations of post-match 
alcohol consumption in later years! 
 While parents might struggle with information and choice overload the 
effect of free choice at the social level also has to be considered. Fukuyama 
argues that there will be in effect a ‘genetic arms race’ with parents forced 
to ‘choose’ to prevent their child being disadvantaged (Fukuyama  2002 ). 
Currently parents only have a choice from available embryos for specifi c 
traits but if many people chose, say, taller and more intelligent children 
(if such a thing became possible), then the average height and IQ would 
simply rise. As an enhancement becomes normal then it is no longer 
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advantageous and so those who wanted their child to have the edge would 
need to seek another ‘improvement’. As Hirsch wrote: ‘If everyone stands 
on tiptoe, no one sees better’ (Hirsch  1977 , p. 5). 
 As research continues and more tests are developed there are also con-
cerns that a right to know may become a routine requirement for parents 
to gain access to welfare services or insurance-based health-care systems. 
In a report on behavioural genetic tests, personalised information on 
behavioural predispositions was seen as valuable but:
 key concerns are that individuals remain free to choose whether or not they pro-
vide this information and suffer no discrimination or disadvantage from with-
holding their genetic information, and that any use of genetic information is 
equal and equitable – advances in behavioural genetics should not benefi t one 
group in society more than another 
 (Dixon  2005 , p. 15) 
 If the behaviour in question is illegal, stigmatised or imposes signifi cant 
economic and social costs on society these ‘key concerns’ that focus on 
individuals would have to compete with concerns about protecting the 
public. As the range of available tests continues to increase what limits 
will there be to individual responsibility ? Hearing of a child born with 
a condition for which there is routine prenatal testing, such as Down’s, 
people might ask whether the mother ‘took the test’, but parents who 
choose to continue with the pregnancy are not necessarily condemned 
(although there is evidence in Britain of an increase in negative attitudes 
to welfare recipients in general and there may be an assumption that the 
disabled will be claimants) (Park  et al .  2013 , p. 30). However, in the case 
of tests for behavioural conditions the parents’ decision could be seen 
as a public rather than a private matter. The child with a genetic trait 
associated with aggressive behaviour, addiction or impulsive behaviour 
might engage in behaviour that negatively affects others. While research 
indicates that these behaviours have multifactorial causes, evidence on 
genetic traits has already been presented in criminal courts, usually 
by the defence, and has in some cases resulted in reduced sentences 
(Calloway  2009 ; Farahany and Coleman  2006 ). Such evidence might 
also be used to argue that these individuals are particularly dangerous 
and likely to reoffend so should have a harsher sentence, particularly if 
they knew their genetic risk (Levitt  2013 ). 
 Parents, especially mothers, have choices to make that were unknown 
in previous generations and this undoubtedly increases anxiety. For some 
parents choosing PGD is empowering; they may be able to choose to 
implant an embryo free of a specifi c genetic disease or have a child who 
is a tissue match for a sibling (a so-called ‘saviour sibling’). 1 But when it 
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comes to non-disease traits or mild conditions are there any lines to draw 
or should all decisions on their children’s genetic make-up be the respon-
sibility of parents, however much further our knowledge and techniques 
develop? At the very least, if there is to be a free market then parents 
would need some way of managing the options available; perhaps expert 
choice advisers and packages of tests with computer-assisted decision-
making programmes. Although parents are focused on their own chil-
dren, it is conceivable that some will see a shared interest in coming 
together to resist testing, selection or enhancement in particular areas 
and/or to promote it in others . 
  Choice 
 The picture that emerges is of the modern individual being bombarded 
with choices accompanied by more or less subtle messages about what 
the good parent or the responsible person should do. The right to 
know has become the responsibility to know. In the fi eld of health care 
and especially genetics, what was considered to be part of nature that 
humans could not change is being opened up to choice. As discussed 
in this chapter, in specifi c circumstances choice can be a burden from 
which people would like to be relieved; it can lead to stress and con-
fusion or if the available choices do not meet expectations, to disap-
pointment and regret. Faced with a long and complicated menu at a 
restaurant, or another familiar set of choices, we can fall back on habit 
and have what we always have or opt for something new and unknown; 
the consequences are probably trivial. When it comes to choices made 
over our own or our children’s health we are more likely to be in an 
unfamiliar situation where we have no experiences or habits to fall back 
on, yet our choices could have serious consequences. In this context 
choice and individual autonomy seem to be an insubstantial ethical 
framework that increases responsibilities but does not give us the means 
to choose well. 
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 NOTES 
  1  There is also the possibility of parents wishing to select an embryo with what 
others would consider a disability. This was prohibited in 2008 in the UK by 
an amendment to the UK Human and Embryology Act (section 13, subsec-
tion 10). This amendment was probably a response to the highly publicised 
case in 2002 when a lesbian couple selected a sperm donor with hereditary 
deafness, and subsequently had a deaf child. However, they did not make use 
of PGD as their donor was a family friend. 
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